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Abstract—An operator-assisted user-provided network (UPN)
has the potential to achieve a low cost ubiquitous Internet connec-
tivity, without significantly increasing the network infrastructure
investment. In this paper, we consider such a network where the
network operator encourages some of her subscribers to operate
as mobile Wi-Fi hotspots (hosts), providing Internet connectivity
for other subscribers (clients). We formulate the interaction
between the operator and mobile users as a two-stage game.
In Stage I, the operator determines the usage-based pricing and
quota-based incentive mechanism for the data usage. In Stage
II, the mobile users make their decisions about whether to be a
host, or a client, or not a subscriber at all. We characterize how
the users’ membership choices will affect each other’s payoffs in
Stage II, and how the operator optimizes her decision in Stage
I to maximize her profit. Our theoretical and numerical results
show that the operator’s maximum profit increases with the user
density under the proposed hybrid pricing mechanism, and the
profit gain can be up to 50% in a dense network comparing with
a pricing-only approach with no incentives.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
The explosion of mobile data traffic and the proliferation of
advanced mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets have
led to a novel network connection paradigm, often known as
User-provided Network (UPN), in which users act as micro-
providers (hosts) through their personal devices and provide
Internet connections for others [1], [2]. By exploiting the
diversity of users’ demands and crowdsourcing their Internet
connectivities, the UPN can achieve a low-cost ubiquitous
Internet connectivity without the need of significant additional
network infrastructure investment. Because of this, it has been
recently introduced by 3GPP as a complementary commu-
nication and network scheme to existing infrastructure-based
cellular network structures [3].
The commercial UPN services are becoming increasingly
popular in recent years. Some of these services rely on fixed
hosts such as residential Femtocell and Wi-Fi access points
(APs) [4]–[8].1 Other UPN models are more flexible, and rely
on mobile host devices such as smartphones and customized
portable devices [9], [10]. One prominent commercial UPN
example based on mobile hosts is the service launched by a
recent Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) Karma [9],
which enables some of her subscribers to operate as Mobile
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1A typical commercial UPN example based on fixed hotspots is the Wi-
Fi community network introduced by FON [4], where each FON subscriber
offers Internet access to other FON subscribers through his residential Wi-Fi.
Wi-Fi (MiFi) hosts (or simply called hosts) and offer Internet
access to other subscribers (called clients). Another mobile
UPN example is enabled by the crowdsourced networking
software OpenGarden [10], where nearby mobile devices cre-
ate a mesh network, and aggregate their Internet connections.
The key difference between Karma and OpenGarden is that
in the former case, an operator assists the UPN service (by
addressing the security and incentive issues), while in the
latter case, mobile users operate autonomously without relying
on an operator. In this work, we will study the operator-
assisted mobile UPN model motivated by Karma [9], and focus
on both the user’s membership selection mechanism and the
operation’s pricing/incentive design issue.
The success of a UPN service relies on the users’ will-
ingness to contribute their Internet connectivities and network
resources. Hence, it is important to design effective incentive
mechanisms for encouraging mobile users to serve as hosts [2].
As an example, the Karma operator offers some free data quota
reward to those hosts who share their 4G Internet connections
[9]. Several recent studies further proposed improved incentive
mechanisms for UPN [11], [12], motivated by the commer-
cial practices. Specifically, in [11], Gao et al. considered a
Karma-like UPN model, and studied the operator’s problem
of designing the best pricing and free data quota rewarding
strategy for a single host, considering the data demands from
both the host and his clients. In [12], Iosifidis et al. considered
an OpenGarden-like UPN network, and designed a distributed
bargaining-based virtual currency system that incentivizes
nearby mobile users to fairly and efficiently share connectivity
and resources. However, these prior studies either focus on the
interaction between a particular host and his clients [11], or on
a static network with a fixed topology [12], and none of them
considers issues encountered in a mobile network without a
fixed topology, and how the users’ membership choices evolve
in such networks. Starting from some stylized network models,
this paper represents a first step towards understanding these
important practical network design and operational issues.
B. Model and Contributions
In this work, we consider an operator-assisted mobile UPN
facilitated by an MVNO. Similar to Karma, the MVNO is
a special wireless service provider, who does not own radio
spectrum and/or wireless network infrastructure, but lease
these resources from traditional Mobile Network Operators
(MNOs) [?]. Comparing with traditional MNOs, an MVNO
can employ novel and flexible services and business models
better tailored to the needs of their subscribers, hence can
better reach niche markets that are under-served by MNOs. In
our model, the MVNO offers Internet access service to two
types of subscribers (hosts and clients) based on the UPN:
ar
X
iv
:1
50
2.
06
32
7v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
9 A
pr
 20
15
2MVNO
Host 1
4G
3G
3G
3G
/4G
 3G/4G 
WiF
i WiFi
Host 2
Client 1 Client 2 Client 3
Client 4
Alien
WiFi
Fig. 1. System Model: Hosts (Blue), Clients (Orange), and Aliens (White).
• A host can connect to the MVNO’s network directly
(via a customized portable device) and pay a usage-based
price. He can also operate as a mobile hotspot and share
his Internet connection with clients, and get some free
data quota reward from the MVNO as the incentive.
• A client can only connect to the MVNO’s network via a
nearby host and pay a usage-based price.
Given these two choices, each mobile user needs to decide
whether to subscribe to the MVNO, and if so, which member-
ship (host or client) to choose. A mobile user can also choose
not to subscribe to the MVNO and become an alien.
Figure 1 illustrates such an operator-assisted mobile UPN
model, where hosts, clients, and aliens are denoted by blue,
orange, and white circles, respectively. In this example, client 1
connects to the MVNO’s network through host 1, clients 2 and
3 connect to the MVNO’s network through host 2, and client
4 cannot connect to the MVNO’s network at this moment,
as no nearby host can serve it at this instant. As users move
around in the network, client 4 may eventually meet some
hosts through which he connect to the Internet later on.
In such an operator-assisted UPN model, we are interested
in answering two key questions:
1) What is the best membership choice for each mobile
user, and how different users’ choices affect each other?
2) What is the MVNO’s best pricing and free data quota
rewarding strategy that maximizes her profit?
We study the above problems from the game-theoretic perspec-
tive. More specifically, we formulate the interactions among
the MVNO and mobile users as a two-stage Stackelberg game,
and analyze the game equilibrium systematically.
In Stage I, the MVNO determines the best price and free
data quota reward to maximize her profit gained from all
subscribers (hosts and clients). A higher price will attract less
subscribers, but can generate a higher revenue per subscriber.
A higher free data quota reward (to hosts) makes it more
attractive to be a host, hence will increase the number of hosts.
Consequently, as the number of hosts increases, clients can
find hosts more easily, hence more clients will have incentive
to joint the UPN. On the other hand, a higher free data quota
will naturally reduce the revenue that the MVNO can achieve
from each client (due to a higher reward to host).
In Stage II, mobile users select their best membership types
(i.e., host, client, or alien), given the price and free data quota
reward provided by the MVNO. Note that different users’
decisions are coupled with each other. For example, the payoff
of a client increases as the number of hosts in the network
increases, due to an increased chance of accessing the Internet.
Similarly, a host’s payoff increases as the number of clients
increases, but its payoff is reduced as the number of hosts is
increased due to the increased competition among hosts. We
characterize how different users’ membership selections affect
each other, and how the membership distribution dynamically
evolves over time until reaching a stable distribution (called
membership selection equilibrium).
The key contributions are summarized as follows.
• This is the first work that systemically studies and charac-
terizes the membership evolution and the corresponding
equilibrium in a mobile UPN.
• Based on the membership selection equilibrium analysis,
we further characterize the MVNO’s best pricing and
incentive mechanism that maximizes her profit.
• We perform extensive numerical studies and show that
the MVNO’s maximum profit increases with the user
density under the proposed hybrid pricing and incentive
mechanism, and the profit gain can be up to 50% in a
dense network comparing with the optimized pricing-only
benchmark without incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the system model. In Sections III, we analyze
the proposed two-stage game. In Section IV, we present the
simulations and finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. The Detailed Network Model
We consider a UPN with one MVNO and a set N =
{1, 2, · · · , N} of mobile users. Similar to Karma [9], the
MVNO provides Internet access to its subscribers using wire-
less resources leased from traditional MNOs. Each mobile user
decides whether to subscribe to the MVNO, and if so, what
membership type (host or client) to choose. Users’ decisions
not only depend on the MVNO’s pricing and incentive mech-
anism (to be defined in Section II-C), but also on how often
they meet each other (and hence can form a UPN).
We consider a time-slotted system, where mobile users may
change their locations and hence have different neighbours in
different time slots. As a first step to understand the impact
of mobility on the users’ choices, we consider a simple model
based on the Erdos-Renyi random graph model widely-used in
graph theory [14]: Mobile users move randomly in a certain
area, and each user has the same probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) of
meeting any other user in each time slot.2 This meeting prob-
ability does not change over time, and the meeting events are
independent across time slots. Such a homogeneous mobility
model allows us to get closed form expressions and gain
valuable insights into the design of UPN. We will consider
more detailed mobility models in our future work.
For analytical convenience, we assume a large network with
many users (e.g., N → ∞) and small meeting probability ρ
(e.g., ρ → 0). This assumption is mainly used for obtaining
the closed form result, and our analysis method holds for small
networks as well. To make the model meaningful, we assume
that the average number of neighbours that a user meets in
each time slot, denoted by λ , N · ρ, is a finite value.
2Here “meeting” means that they are close enough and can form a UPN.
3B. The MVNO Model
The MVNO’s goal is to maximize her profit, which depends
on the revenue collected from her subscribers (hosts and
clients). Specifically, the MVNO charges her subscribers a
usage-based price for the data consumption, while offering a
free data quota to encourage a host to provide Internet access
for his clients. This quota is proportional to the total amount
of data that the host forwards for clients.
Let p ∈ [0, pMAX] denote the price per byte of data usage
(for both hosts and clients), and δ ∈ [0, 1] denote the free
data quota ratio (for hosts). Namely, if a host forwards D
bytes of data for clients, he can get δD bytes of free data
from the MVNO. Clearly, a larger δ encourages more users to
subscribe as hosts. The objective of the MVNO is to determine
the proper p and δ to maximize her profit.
It should be noted that with the free data quota, two nearby
hosts may pretend to be clients and each connects to the other’s
MiFi device. By doing so, both hosts gain certain free data
quota by forwarding data for the other user, and both users are
better off with no benefit to the network. To prevent such an
arbitrage due to collusion, the MVNO offers a price discount
equal to the free data quota ratio δ for the data usage of each
host, i.e., a host only pays a price of p(1− δ) for each unit of
his own data.3 Obviously, with this modification, a host has no
incentive to collude with other and pretend to be a client.
C. The Mobile User Model
Each user has a service request probability θ ∈ [0, 1], re-
ferred to as the type of user. Different users may have different
types, which are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
according to a probability distribution function f(θ). Such
a service request probability can also represent the user’s
QoS requirement. For example, a user with a higher data rate
requirement will have a larger θ.
In this work, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium where
users with the same type θ will always make the same
membership choice. Moreover, we focus on the user pure-
strategy behaviour where each user will choose a specific
membership under a given network situation. Namely, a user
makes his membership choice s ∈ {H, C, A}, where
• H: Subscribe to the MVNO as a host;
• C: Subscribe to the MVNO as a client;
• A: Do not subscribe to the MVNO and remain as an alien.
The payoff of each user is the difference between the
achieved benefit and the incurred cost. For convenience, we
denote the payoff of a type-θ user under membership s by
Uθ(s). The objective of the user is to choose the proper
membership to maximize his payoff.
1) Alien: An alien does not subscribe to the MVNO, hence
cannot connect to the MVNO’s network. He may access the
Internet through other means. Without loss of generality, we
normalize an alien’s payoff to be zero:4
Uθ(A) = 0. (1)
3Our analysis can be applied to a more general case with a host price (for
all hosts) and a client price (for all clients). Here we use the same price (for
hosts and clients) in order to comply with the real Karma case [9].
4If an alien’s payoff is a positive constant, we can always normalize it to
zero by redefining the cost terms of φH and φC later on.
2) Client: A client can only connect to the MVNO’s network
via an MiFi hotspot provided by a nearby host. Hence, the
payoff of a client depends on the probability that he can meet
hosts. If a client meets multiple hosts at the same time, he
randomly chooses one host for his connection. Let PH denote
the probability of a client meeting at least one host in a time
slot (derived in Section III-A). Then, the expected payoff (per
time slot) of a type-θ client is
Uθ(C) = θ · PH · (v¯C − γC − p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠC
−φC, (2)
where v¯C is the average data value for a client, γC is the average
transmission cost of a client (e.g., the energy cost), and φC is
the time-average cost of being a client (e.g., the subscription
fee and advance payment). For notational convenience, we
denote ΠC = v¯C − γC − p as the client’s average benefit of
consuming one byte of data.
3) Host: A host can connect to the MVNO’s network
anytime via his MiFi device. Meanwhile, this MiFi device can
also provide Internet connections for nearby clients, and the
host can gain certain free data quota (depending on the total
amount of data that he forwards for clients). It is important to
note that a host shares only his Internet connection, but not
his data, with clients. That is, clients need to pay for their
own data usage. Clearly, the payoff of a host depends on the
number of clients that he serves as well as the data usage
of his served clients. Let YC denote the average number of
clients that a host serves in a time slot (derived in Section
III-A), and θ¯C denote the average service request probability
of clients (derived in Section III-A). Then, the expected payoff
(per time slot) of a type-θ host is5
Uθ(H) =
θ · (v¯H − γH − p(1− δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠH
+ θ¯C · YC · (δp− γHC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π˜H
−φH, (3)
where v¯H is the average data value for a host, γH and γHC
are the average transmission costs of a host for his own data
and for his served clients’ data, respectively, φH is the time-
average cost of being a host (e.g., the cost of purchasing the
MiFi device, the subscription fee, and advance payment). For
notational convenience, we denote ΠH = v¯H−γH−p·(1−δ) as
the host’s average benefit of consuming one byte of data, and
Π˜H = δ · p − γHC as the host’s average benefit of forwarding
one byte of data for his clients.
To avoid the trivial scenarios, we further assume:
• ΠH > ΠC: The host’s average data usage benefit is
larger than that of a client. This is because the host
can reserve higher quality wireless resources for his own
transmission, and the data price for the host is discounted;
• φH > φC: The time-average cost of being a host is higher
than that of a client. This is because the host needs to
purchase and maintain the MiFi device;
• Π˜H > 0: That is, hosts can always benefit from serving
clients. This is important for encouraging hosts to share
their Internet connections with clients. If this is violated,
then there will be no UPN.
5This equation implies that if the rewarded free data quota is larger than a
host’s actual data request, he can either transfer the excessive free data into
the monetary reward, or reserve the excessive free data for the future usage.
4D. Problem Definition
We formulate the interactions between the MVNO and
mobile users as a two-stage Stackelberg game.
In Stage I, the MVNO decides the price p and the free data
quota ratio δ to maximize the expected profit. Notice that the
MVNO earns p · (1− δ) per byte of data from both hosts and
clients, and meanwhile pays the MNOs a resource leasing cost
ω for his subscribers’ data consumption. Thus, the expected
profit (per time slot) of the MVNO is
V (p, δ) = (µHθ¯H + PH · µCθ¯C) · (p · (1− δ)− ω) ·N, (4)
where µH and µC denote the percentages of hosts and clients,
respectively, θ¯H and θ¯C denote the average service request
probabilities of hosts and clients, respectively. The scale factor
PH on θ¯C implies that a client can consume data only when
he meets at least one host. Keep in mind that µH, µC, θ¯H, θ¯C,
and PH are all functions of (p, δ) derived in Stage II.
In Stage II, mobile users decide their memberships (i.e.,
host, client, or alien), given the price p and free data quota
ratio δ announced by the MVNO in Stage I. Different users’
decisions are coupled. For example, with more users choosing
to be hosts, the payoff of being a client will increase (due to
a larger meeting probability PH). Similarly, with more users
choosing to be clients, the payoff of being a host will increase
(due to a larger client number YC).
III. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we will study the Subgame Perfect Equilib-
rium (SPE) of the proposed two-stage Stackelberg game.
Definition 1 (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)). A strategy
profile {(p∗, δ∗), (s∗(θ),∀θ ∈ [0, 1])}, where (p∗, δ∗) is the
MVNO’s strategy in Stage I and s∗(θ) is a type-θ user’s
strategy in Stage II, is an SPE if and only if 6{
Stage II: Uθ(s∗(θ)) ≥ Uθ(s), ∀θ ∈ [0, 1], s ∈ {A, C, H};
Stage I: V (p∗, δ∗) ≥ V (p, δ), ∀p ∈ [0, pMAX], δ ∈ [0, 1].
We will derive the SPE by backward induction. Namely,
we first study the user membership selection game in Stage II,
and characterize the users’ equilibrium membership decisions.
Then we characterize the MVNO’s optimal price and free data
quota ratio that maximize her profit in Stage I.
A. Derivation of Several Important Variables
Before studying the game equilibrium, we first derive the
values of PH, YC, θ¯C, and θ¯H analytically.
1) Calculation of θ¯C and θ¯H (Average service request
probabilities of clients and hosts): For convenience, we denote
ΘA, ΘC, and ΘH as the sets of service request probability
θ with which users choose to be aliens, clients, and hosts,
respectively. Obviously, ΘA, ΘC, and ΘH form a partition of
the whole user-type set, i.e., ΘA ∪ ΘC ∪ ΘH = [0, 1]. Let µA,
µC, and µH denote the percentages of aliens, clients, and hosts,
respectively. That is,
µs =
∫
θ∈Θs
f(θ)dθ, ∀s ∈ {A, C, H}. (5)
6To be more precise, Stage II equilibrium should be written as s∗(θ, p, δ),
as the membership selection is a function of the type θ, price p, and free data
quota δ. We will keep s∗(θ) for the simplicity of presentation.
Then, the average service request probabilities of clients and
hosts are, respectively,
θ¯C =
1
µC
∫
θ∈ΘC
θ · f(θ)dθ, and θ¯H = 1
µH
∫
θ∈ΘH
θ · f(θ)dθ.
(6)
To obtain closed form results, in the rest of the analysis, we
assume a uniform distribution for θ, i.e., f(θ) = 1,∀θ ∈ [0, 1].
Note, however, that our analysis method holds for an arbitrary
distribution function f(θ).
2) Calculation of PH (Probability of meeting at least
one host): Consider a user i in the network. Based on our
assumption in Section II-A, the probability that user i meets
another user j is ρ. Based on the discussion in Section III-A.1,
the probability that such a user j being a host is µH. Since there
are a total of N − 1 other users (excluding i), the probability
that user i does not meet any host is (1−ρµH)N−1. Thus, the
probability that user i meets at least one host is:
PH = 1− (1− ρ · µH)N−1. (7)
As we have assumed that N is very large and ρ is very
small, we can rewrite PH in the following way:
PH = lim
N→∞
1− (1− λN · µH)N−1 = 1− e−µHλ, (8)
where λ = N · ρ denotes the average number of users (host,
client, or alien) that a user meets in each time slot.
3) Calculation of YC (Average number of clients connected
to a host): Consider an arbitrary host i in this network. We first
notice that when a client meets multiple hosts at the same time,
he will randomly pick one to connect. Hence, the probability
that host i is chosen by a client j that he meets is:
P CONC = 1 · P (0)H +
1
2
· P (1)H + ...+ 1N − 1 · P
(N−2)
H , (9)
where P (k)H denotes the probability that client j meets k other
hosts except host i. We further notice that (i) the probability
that client j meets another user is ρ, (ii) the probability that
such a user being a host is µH, and (iii) there are a total of
N − 2 other users (excluding i and j) that client j can meet.
Hence, the probability that client j meets k other hosts is:
P
(k)
H =
(
N−2
k
) · (ρµH)k · (1− ρµH)N−2−k, (10)
which follows the binomial distribution (with a total of N −2
trials and a success probability ρµh in each trial). As N is
very large and ρ = λN is very small, we will have:
P
(k)
H = lim
N→∞
(
N−2
k
) · ( λN µH)k · (1− λN µH)N−2−k
=
(µHλ)
k
k!
· e−µHλ,
(11)
which follows the Poisson distribution (with an arrival rate of
µHλ). Hence, the probability that host i is chosen by a client
j that he meets can be rewritten as:
P CONC = lim
N→∞
N−2∑
k=0
1
k + 1
· (µHλ)
k
k!
· e−µHλ
=
1
µHλ
· (1− e−µHλ).
(12)
We further notice that the average number of clients that a
host i meets in each time slot is (N − 1) · ρµC. Hence, the
average number of clients connected to host i is:
YC = lim
N→∞
(N − 1) · ρµC · P CONC =
µC
µH
· (1− e−µHλ). (13)
5B. Stage II: User Membership Selection Game
Now we study the user membership selection game in Stage
II, given the MVNO’s decision (p, δ) in Stage I.
As discussed previously, the sets of aliens, clients, and
hosts already in the system (i.e., ΘA, ΘC, and Θs) and their
corresponding percentages (i.e., µA, µC, and µs) will affect the
values of PH, YC, θ¯C, and θ¯H, and further affect the user payoff
and membership selection. Hence, in what follows, we will
first study what is the user’s best membership decision under
a particular membership distribution {ΘA,ΘC,ΘH}. Then, we
will study how the user membership decision dynamically
evolves over time, and what is the stable membership dis-
tribution (called membership selection equilibrium).
1) User Best Membership Selection: Given the MVNO’s
strategy (p, δ), and under a particular initial membership
distribution {ΘA,ΘC,ΘH}, the payoff of a type-θ user is:
Uθ(s) =

0, if s = A,
θPHΠC − φC, if s = C,
θΠH,+θ¯CYCΠ˜H − φH, if s = H.
(14)
A type-θ user will choose to be a client, if and only if
Uθ(s = C) ≥ max{0, Uθ(s = H)}, (15)
and choose to be a host, if and only if
Uθ(s = H) ≥ max{0, Uθ(s = C)}. (16)
We further notice that ΠH > PHΠC (as ΠH > ΠC and
PH ≤ 1). Then, we can immediately obtain the following
observation: (i) if a type-θ prefers to be a host, then all users
with a type larger than θ prefer to be a host; and (ii) if a type-θ
prefers to be an alien, then all users with a type smaller than
θ prefer to be an alien. Intuitively, this is because a higher
type user has a stronger preference of being a host due to
the higher data usage benefit, and a lower type user has a
stronger preference of being an alien due to the lower data
usage benefit.
Based on the above, we have the following lemma.7
Lemma 1. The best user membership selection under a
given initial membership distribution {ΘA,ΘC,ΘH} can be
characterized by two threshold types θA and θH, where
θA =
[
min
{
φC
PHΠC
, φH−θ¯CYCΠ˜HΠH
}]1
0
,
θH =
[
max
{
φH−θ¯CYCΠ˜H
ΠH
, φH−φC−θ¯CYCΠ˜HΠH−PHΠC
}]1
0
,
(17)
with [x]10 , min{max{x, 0}, 1}. Here, θA denotes the largest
θ that a type-θ user prefers to be an alien, and θH denotes the
smallest θ that a type-θ user prefers to be a host. Moreover,
users with a type between θA and θH prefer to be clients.
It is easy to see that θA ≤ θH, as θA ≤ [φH−θ¯CYCΠ˜HΠH ]10 ≤ θH
according to (17). Note that θA = θH implies that no user
chooses to be a client.
Obviously, under the user best membership selection, the
newly derived membership distribution may be different from
the initial one. We denote the newly derived membership
distribution by {Θ′A,Θ′C,Θ′H}, and the associated membership
percentages as {µ′A, µ′C, µ′H}. Formally,
7Due to space limit, we put the proofs in the online technical report [15].
Proposition 1. Given an initial distribution {ΘA,ΘC,ΘH}, the
newly derived membership distribution {Θ′A,Θ′C,Θ′H} is
Θ′A = [0, θA], Θ
′
C = [θA, θH], Θ
′
H = [θH, 1], (18)
and the associated percentages {µ′A, µ′C, µ′H} are given by:
µ′A = θA, µ
′
C = θH − θA, µ′H = 1− θH. (19)
Note that in the above analysis, we assume that all users
make simultaneous best membership selections.
2) Membership Distribution Dynamics: The membership
distribution change in (18) and (19) continues evolving over
time, until it reaches a stable distribution (called membership
selection equilibrium), where no user has the incentive to
change his choice. Now we study such a membership distri-
bution dynamics, and characterize the membership selection
equilibrium in Stage II.
Suppose that each user selects membership once in each
time slot. Without loss of generality, we consider the mem-
bership distribution change in a generic time slot t. Let
{ΘtA,ΘtC,ΘtH} denote the initial membership distribution at
the beginning of slot t, and {Θt+1A ,Θt+1C ,Θt+1H } denote the
newly derived membership distribution in time slot t (after
one round best response of each user). A membership selection
equilibrium is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A membership distribution {ΘtA,ΘtC,ΘtH} is a
membership selection equilibrium if and only if
Θt+1A = Θ
t
A, Θ
t+1
C = Θ
t
C, Θ
t+1
H = Θ
t
H.
This implies that if {ΘtA,ΘtC,ΘtH} is a membership selection
equilibrium, then we will have: Θτs = Θ
t
s, ∀s ∈ {A, C, H}, for
all future time slots τ > t. Notice that a membership distri-
bution {ΘA,ΘC,ΘH} can be fully characterized by threshold
types {θA, θH} or membership percentages {µC, µH}. Hence,
we can characterize the membership selection equilibrium by
(i) θt+1A = θ
t
A, θ
t+1
H = θ
t
H,
or (ii) µt+1C = µ
t
C, µ
t+1
H = µ
t
H.
Thus, we have the following lemma for computing the equi-
librium with respect to {µC, µH}.
Lemma 2. The membership selection equilibrium {µC, µH}
satisfies the following equations:{
µC = θH(µC, µH)− θA(µC, µH),
µH = 1− θH(µC, µH),
(20)
where θH(µC, µH) and θA(µC, µH) are threshold types defined
in (17), and are functions of percentages {µC, µH}.
We next discuss the existence and uniqueness of member-
ship selection equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Existence). There exists at least one equilibrium
in the membership selection game in Stage II.
However, in general we cannot guarantee the uniqueness of
equilibrium. In fact, there may be multiple solutions for the
equations in (20), which implies that there may be multiple
equilibria. Nevertheless, it can be verified that when multiple
equilibria exists, the final equilibrium point is uniquely deter-
mined by the initial membership distribution. Thus, we have
the following conditional uniqueness.
6Theorem 2 (Uniqueness). Given any initial membership dis-
tribution, the simultaneous best response dynamics evolve to
a unique membership selection equilibrium.
In this work, we assume an initial distribution with µC =
0 and µH = 0, i.e., all users are aliens initially. This is a
reasonable assumption, as all users are aliens before joining
the UPN. We further illustrate the dynamics of membership
percentages in [15].
C. Stage I: MVNO’s Best Decision
Now we study the MVNO’s best price and free data quota
ratio strategy (p, δ) in Stage I.
We have shown that given any MVNO strategy (p, δ), the
user membership selection game will converge to a unique
equilibrium (from the initial state µC = 0 and µH = 0), denoted
by {µ∗C, µ∗H} or {µ∗C(p, δ), µ∗H(p, δ)}. Equivalently, we can write
the equilibrium membership distribution {Θ∗A,Θ∗C,Θ∗H} as
Θ∗A = [0, 1− µ∗C − µ∗H],
Θ∗C = (1− µ∗C − µ∗H, 1− µ∗H],
Θ∗H = (1− µ∗H, 1].
(21)
By Eq. (6), we can further derive the average service request
probabilities of clients and hosts under the membership selec-
tion equilibrium, i.e., θ¯
∗
C =
∫
θ∈Θ∗C
θ·f(θ)dθ
µ∗C
=
2−2µ∗H−µ∗C
2 ,
θ¯∗H =
∫
θ∈Θ∗H
θ·f(θ)dθ
µ∗H
=
2−µ∗H
2 .
(22)
It is easy to see that θ¯∗C and θ¯
∗
H are functions of p and δ (as
µ∗C and µ
∗
H are functions of p and δ), and hence can be written
as θ¯∗C(p, δ) and θ¯
∗
H(p, δ). Therefore, by (4), the MVNO’s profit
optimization problem can be written as
max
{p,δ}
(
X∗H (p, δ) +X
∗
C (p, δ)
) · (p(1− δ)− ω), (23)
where X∗H (p, δ) = N · µ∗H(p, δ) · θ¯∗H(p, δ) and X∗C (p, δ) = N ·
µ∗C(p, δ) · θ¯∗C(p, δ) ·PH(p, δ) denote the average amount of data
that hosts and clients consume, respectively.
We can check that the MVNO’s optimization problem (23)
is non-convex. Hence, it is difficult to obtain the closed form
solution of the optimal price and free data quota ratio (p∗, δ∗).
Fortunately, problem (23) is a two-variable optimization prob-
lem with box constraint sets (i.e., p ∈ [0, pMAX] and δ ∈ [0, 1]),
and hence can be effectively solved by using certain numerical
methods such as the branch-and-bound method.
We solve problem (23) in the following sequential manner.
First, we find the optimal price p∗(δ) under any δ through one
dimensional search. Second, we find the optimal δ∗(p) under
any price p through one dimensional search. Then,
Proposition 3. The MVNO’s best strategy (p∗, δ∗) must occur
at an intersection point of p∗(δ) and δ∗(p).
IV. SIMULATION
We perform numerical studies in a network with the fol-
lowing parameters: v¯H = 15, v¯C = 10, φH = 5, φC = 1,
γH = 0.5, γHC = 1, γC = 0.1, and ω = 0.5. Notice that we
assume that a host’s transmission cost for his own data (γH) is
smaller than that for a client’s data (γHC), as the host not only
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Fig. 2. MVNO’s maximum profit as a function of λ
needs to forward the client data to the MVNO’s network via
the 3G/4G cellular connection, but also needs to communicate
with the client through the Wi-Fi connection.
In Figure 2, we present the MVNO’s maximum profits under
the proposed best pricing and incentive mechanism (called
hybrid pricing) and the optimal pricing-only strategy without
incentive (i.e., for a fixed δ = 0). Figure 2 shows that as
long as λ > 0, our proposed hybrid pricing strategy always
outperforms the pricing-only strategy in terms of the MVNO’s
profit. Such a profit gain increases with λ, and can reach 50%
when λ = 10. This implies that the MVNO can achieve a
larger gain in a dense network with a larger λ.
Due to space limit, we put more simulation results in the
online technical report [15].
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we first studied the user membership evolution
in an operator-assisted UPN, and then studied the MVNO’s
best strategy that maximizes her profit. Our studies address
the incentive and optimality issues in a UPN from the system
perspective. There are several interesting directions for future
research, such as considering more realistic mobility models
and the impact of users’ social relationship on the membership
selection and Internet connection sharing decisions.
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VI. APPENDIX – SIMULATIONS, ILLUSTRATIONS, AND
NOTATIONS TABLE
A. Simulations
We perform numerical studies in a network with the fol-
lowing parameters: v¯H = 15, v¯C = 10, φH = 5, φC = 1,
γH = 0.5, γHC = 1, γC = 0.1, and ω = 0.5. Notice that we
assume that a host’s transmission cost for his own data (γH) is
smaller than that for a client’s data (γHC), as the host not only
needs to forward the client data to the MVNO’s network via
the 3G/4G cellular connection, but also needs to communicate
with the client through the Wi-Fi connection.
(1) Membership Selection Equilibrium in Stage II
Impact of System Parameter λ: Recall that λ = N ·ρ denotes
the average number of users that a user meets in each time
slot, which is proportional to the user meeting probability ρ.
Figure 3 shows that under a fixed value of (p = 2, δ = 0.4),
the equilibrium percentage of alien µ∗A decreases with λ, as
a larger λ implies a higher meeting probability among users,
which encourages users to subscribe to the operator. Figure 3
also shows that among the subscribers, the percentage of host
µ∗H decreases with λ and the percentage of client µ
∗
C increases
with λ. This implies that a larger λ provides more incentive
for being a client than being a host.
Impacts of the MVNO’s Decisions p and δ: Figure 4 shows
that when increasing the price p, the equilibrium percentage
of client µ∗C monotonically decreases due to the increased data
cost, while the equilibrium percentage of host µ∗H first increases
(when p is small) and then decreases (when p is large). This
is due to the fact that when p is small, the total free data quota
δD is large (as the client demand D = θ¯C · YC is large), and
hence a host can achieve a larger monetary reward (p · δD)
when p increases. When p is large (e.g., p ≥ 8), the free data
quota δD is small (since the client demand D becomes small),
and hence the host can only achieve little monetary reward
(p ·δD) when p increases. Figure 5 shows that the equilibrium
percentage of host µ∗H monotonically increases with the free
data quota ratio δ, and the equilibrium percentage of client µ∗C
monotonically decreases with δ. This implies that a larger δ
provides more incentive for being a host than being a client.
(2) MVNO’s Strategy and Profit in Stage I
In Figure 6, we present the MVNO’s maximum profits under
the proposed best pricing and incentive mechanism (called
hybrid pricing) and the optimal pricing-only strategy without
incentive (i.e., for a fixed δ = 0). Figure 6 shows that as
long as λ > 0, our proposed hybrid pricing strategy always
outperforms the pricing-only strategy in terms of the MVNO’s
profit. Such a profit gain increases with λ, and can reach 50%
when λ = 10. This implies that the MVNO can achieve a
larger gain in a dense network with a larger λ.
Figure 6 further shows that the MVNO’s profit always
increases with λ under the hybrid pricing strategy. However,
the profit first increases and then decreases with λ under the
pricing only strategy. This is because under our proposed
hybrid pricing strategy, both hosts and clients benefit from a
larger λ; while under the pricing-only strategy, only clients
benefit from a larger λ (due to the lack of incentive for
hosts). Hence, under the hybrid pricing strategy, the MVNO
can potentially generate more profit from hosts and clients
with an increased value of λ. Under the pricing-only strategy,
when λ is small, the MVNO can generate more profit (from an
increased number of clients) when λ increases; while when λ
is large, the MVNO will generate less profit (due to a reduced
number of hosts) when λ increases. Intuitively, our proposed
hybrid pricing strategy exploits the benefits of larger values of
λ for both hosts and clients, while the pricing-only strategy
only exploits the benefit for clients.
Figure 7 shows the MVNO’s best hybrid pricing strategy
under different values of λ. We can see that both price p∗ and
free data quota ratio δ∗ increase with λ. This is because both
hosts and clients benefit from a larger λ, hence the MVNO can
potentially charge a higher price to both hosts and clients. Due
to the increased revenue from hosts and clients, the MVNO is
willing to award more free data quota to hosts, so as to attract
more hosts (and further attract more clients).
B. Illustration of Equilibrium in Section III-B
Figure 8 illustrates three different types of membership
selection equilibrium: (a) All users choose to be aliens (where
θA = θH = 1, and µ
∗
A = 1, µ
∗
C = µ
∗
H = 0). This occurs,
for example, when both the time-average costs of being a
client φC and being a host φH are very large; (b) Low type
users choose to be aliens, high type users choose to be hosts,
and no user chooses to be clients (where θA = θH < 1,
and µ∗A > 0, µ
∗
C = 0, µ
∗
H > 0). This occurs, for example,
when φC is close to φH; and (c) Low type users choose to
be aliens, medium type users choose to be clients, and high
type users choose to be hosts (where θA < θH < 1 and
µ∗A > 0, µ
∗
C > 0, µ
∗
H > 0).
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Fig. 6. MVNO’s maximum profit as a function of λ
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Fig. 7. MVNO’s best hybrid pricing strategy as a function of λ
C. Illustration of Membership Dynamics in Section III-B
Figure 9 illustrates the dynamics of membership percentages
µC and µH under a given network setting. In this example,
the membership dynamics converge to the equilibrium within
around 10 iterations, and the equilibrium membership percent-
age is (µC = 0.47, µH = 0.38, µA = 0.15).
D. Illustration of δ∗(p) and p∗(δ) in Section III-C
Figure 10 illustrates the optimal δ∗(p) curve (blue) and
the optimal p∗(δ) curve (black). The optimal MVNO strategy
(p∗, δ∗) occurs at the intersection point of p∗(δ) and δ∗(p).
In this example, the optimal MVNO strategy is (p∗, δ∗) =
(7.1, 0.1). The pricing only case corresponds to p∗(0), i.e.,
p = 6.5 and δ = 0.
E. Notations Table
The key notations in this paper are listed in Table I.
(a) µ
∗
A
0 θA = θH = 1
(b)
0 1
µ∗A µ
∗
H
θA = θH
(c)
0 1
µ∗A µ
∗
C µ
∗
H
θA θH
Fig. 8. Three types of equilibrium: (a) All Aliens, (b) Aliens and Hosts, (c)
Aliens, Clients, and Hosts.
Fig. 9. Dynamics of µA , µC , and µH .
Fig. 10. Illustration of δ∗(p) and p∗(δ).
9TABLE I
KEY NOTATIONS
MVNO-Related Variables
p The price (per byte of data) for hosts and clients
δ The free data quota ratio for hosts
User-Related Parameters
N The number of users
ρ Encountering (meeting) probability of users
λ Average number of users that a user meets, λ = Nρ
θ Service request probability of users
φC Time-average cost of being client
φH Time-average cost of being host
v¯C Average data value for clients
v¯H Average data value for hosts
γC Average transmission cost of clients
γH Average transmission cost of hosts (for own data)
γHC Average transmission cost of hosts (for client data)
ΠC Average benefit of clients for consuming one byte
of data, ΠC = v¯C − γC − p
ΠH Average benefit of hosts for consuming one byte
of data, ΠH = v¯H − γH − p · (1− δ)
Π˜H Average benefit of hosts for forwarding one byte
of data for clients, Π˜H = δ · p− γHC
Important Variables
µA Percentage of aliens in the network
µC Percentage of clients in the network
µH Percentage of hosts in the network
θ¯C Average service request probability of clients
θ¯H Average service request probability of hosts
PH Probability of meeting at least one host
YC Average number of clients connected to a host
